{"id":140,"date":"2026-08-09T23:47:18","date_gmt":"2026-08-09T23:47:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/?page_id=140"},"modified":"2026-08-23T00:07:36","modified_gmt":"2026-08-23T00:07:36","slug":"2021-unrest","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/?page_id=140","title":{"rendered":"2021 Unrest"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

THE FIRE AND THE RECKONING<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

Cincinnati’s April 2001 Unrest and the Long Road to the Collaborative Agreement<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Research Essay Prepared for the Collaborative 25th Anniversary<\/p>\n\n\n\n

August 2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In memory of Timothy DeWayne Thomas, Jr. (1981\u20132001), and of the fifteen Black men whose deaths at the hands of Cincinnati police preceded his.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contents<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Introduction: A City That Had Been Warned<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A City Already on Edge<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Night Timothy Thomas Died<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Why Did You Shoot Him?” \u2014 The City Council Confrontation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Four Nights<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Mother Buries Her Son<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trial of Stephen Roach<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Cost the City Chose Not to See Coming<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Rupture to the Collaborative Agreement<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legacy and Unfinished Work<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion: What the City Owes the Alley<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction: A City That Had Been Warned<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati does not think of itself as a city given to riot. It is a river city of hills and church steeples, of German beer gardens turned condominiums, of a downtown that empties at dusk and a skyline that looks, from across the Ohio River in Kentucky, almost peaceful. But for four nights in April 2001, that image cracked open. Smoke rose over Over-the-Rhine, the historic immigrant neighborhood just north of downtown. Storefronts were smashed. Fires burned in the streets. Nearly a thousand people were arrested, and for the first time since the National Guard occupied American cities after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., a mayor in Cincinnati declared a citywide curfew and asked the governor of Ohio to send in state troopers to restore order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The spark was a single gunshot fired just after two in the morning on April 7, 2001, in a dark alley off Republic Street. The bullet killed a 19-year-old father named Timothy DeWayne Thomas, Jr. He was unarmed. He was wanted only for a string of nonviolent misdemeanors \u2014 seatbelt violations, driving without a license, missed court dates. He was the fifteenth Black man to die at the hands of Cincinnati police in six years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This essay tells that story \u2014 not only as a chronicle of four days of unrest, but as a human story about a mother demanding an answer from her city, a young officer who fired a single shot he says he cannot fully explain, a community exhausted by grief it had been asked to carry quietly for years, and a city that was forced, in the end, to rebuild the relationship between its police and its people from the ground up. It draws on contemporaneous news coverage, retrospective reporting from the 20th and 25th anniversaries of the unrest, court records, and the text of the Collaborative Agreement itself, cited throughout and listed in full at the end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 1. Timeline of the April 2001 unrest in Cincinnati, compiled from contemporaneous and retrospective news accounts (original graphic).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A City Already on Edge<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

To understand why the killing of one young man ignited four days of unrest, it helps to understand what Cincinnati’s Black community had already absorbed by the spring of 2001. In the six years before Timothy Thomas died, fifteen Black men had been killed in encounters with Cincinnati police \u2014 a toll that residents, clergy, and civil rights attorneys had been raising alarms about for years, largely without success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most recent and most searing of those deaths, still raw when Thomas was killed, was that of Roger Owensby, Jr. In November 2000, Owensby \u2014 a father and an honorably discharged Army sergeant with no criminal record \u2014 was mistaken for a drug dealer, placed in a chokehold, pepper-sprayed, and restrained by Cincinnati police officers. He died in their custody. The officers involved were tried and acquitted. For many Black residents, the acquittal confirmed what they already believed: that there would be no accountability inside the system as it existed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two weeks before Thomas was shot, a coalition that included the Cincinnati Black United Front and the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio had already filed a federal lawsuit accusing the Cincinnati Police Department of decades of racial profiling. The lawsuit was moving through the courts when Thomas was killed; his death would ultimately become part of the same litigation, and the NAACP would join the case in its aftermath.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

None of this excuses what would happen in the days that followed. But it explains why so many people in Over-the-Rhine, Avondale, Walnut Hills, and Bond Hill were not shocked by Thomas’s death so much as they were finally, unbearably, out of patience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Night Timothy Thomas Died<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Timothy Thomas grew up between two homes \u2014 one with his mother, Angela Leisure, in Golf Manor, and one in Over-the-Rhine with Monique Cox, the mother of his five-month-old son, Tywon. He was 19 years old. He had, by that point in his life, accumulated fourteen open warrants, all of them for nonviolent misdemeanors: driving without a license, expired tags, seatbelt violations, missed court appearances for those same infractions. He had been pulled over roughly a dozen times in the preceding three years \u2014 a pattern of contact with police that Black residents across the city recognized instantly as familiar, and that would later become central evidence in the racial-profiling lawsuit against the department.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just after midnight on April 7, 2001, Thomas left the apartment he shared with Cox to buy cigarettes. Outside a nightclub called The Warehouse, an off-duty officer recognized him from prior traffic stops and radioed it in. A dispatcher relayed the description to patrol units: a Black male, roughly six feet tall, wearing a red bandana, with about fourteen warrants outstanding. Thomas ran. Officers, including 27-year-old Patrolman Stephen Roach, gave chase through the streets and alleys of Over-the-Rhine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Roach followed Thomas into a dark, narrow alley off Republic Street. Within seconds, a single shot rang out. Roach would later testify that he believed Thomas was reaching for a weapon \u2014 that in the darkness, he saw Thomas’s hand move toward his waistband and feared for his life. No gun was ever found on Thomas or at the scene. Investigators would later conclude that Thomas may have been pulling up his pants as he ran. He was struck once in the chest and pronounced dead at 3:02 a.m.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By the next morning, his name and his story \u2014 an unarmed teenager, a father, wanted only for traffic tickets, shot dead in an alley \u2014 had already begun moving through Cincinnati’s Black neighborhoods faster than the police department’s official account of what happened. That gap, between what the community already knew in its bones and what the city was prepared to say publicly, would define nearly everything that followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Why Did You Shoot Him?” \u2014 The City Council Confrontation<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Two days after her son’s death, Angela Leisure walked into a packed session of Cincinnati City Council’s Law and Public Safety Committee. The mayor, Charlie Luken, was not present; the meeting was chaired by council member John Cranley. City Hall was standing-room only, filled with residents who had come for one thing: an explanation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Leisure’s attorney, Ken Lawson, pressed the city’s representatives on the one detail that had not been answered \u2014 not whether Thomas had warrants, not whether he ran, but what happened in the instant Officer Roach turned the corner of that alley and fired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that we want to know is, when the man came around the corner, why did you shoot him? That part’s missing. That’s what we came down here for.<\/em>  \u2014 Ken Lawson, attorney for Angela Leisure, April 9, 2001<\/p>\n\n\n\n

City officials, still gathering facts from an active investigation, could not give the room the answer it wanted. Leisure herself spoke directly to the council, telling members that even a full explanation would not undo what had happened, but that she needed to hear them acknowledge what had been taken from her.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That gap between demand and response proved to be the breaking point. Within hours of the meeting, the first night of unrest began.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Four Nights<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

What followed, between the night of April 9 and the early morning of April 13, 2001, was later described by national commentators as the largest urban disturbance in the United States since the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdict, and the worst civil unrest in Cincinnati in more than three decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Night One \u2014 April 9<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Roughly 200 protesters, including Angela Leisure, gathered outside City Hall as the council meeting broke up without the answers they had come for. The demonstration moved into the streets of Over-the-Rhine and downtown. Windows were broken. Small fires were set. Police in riot gear moved to disperse crowds with tear gas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nights Two and Three \u2014 April 10 and 11<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The unrest widened rather than contracted. It spread beyond Over-the-Rhine into downtown proper and touched other majority-Black neighborhoods, including Walnut Hills, Bond Hill, and Avondale. Looting and vandalism damaged more than a hundred businesses over the course of the unrest. On the night of April 11 alone, police made 82 arrests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Night Four and the Curfew \u2014 April 12\u201313<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

By the fourth night, Mayor Luken concluded that city police could not restore order on their own. On the morning of April 13, he declared a citywide state of emergency and imposed an 8 p.m.-to-6 a.m. curfew \u2014 the first such order in Cincinnati in decades. He asked Ohio Governor Bob Taft to send state assistance; roughly 125 Ohio Highway Patrol troopers were deployed to the city. More than 800 people were ultimately arrested for violating the curfew, on top of roughly 150 to 160 arrested for other acts of civil disobedience during the unrest itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By the time the smoke cleared, no one had died in the four days of unrest, though dozens were injured. Property damage was estimated at $3.6 to $3.7 million across roughly 120 businesses and public buildings in Over-the-Rhine and downtown \u2014 a figure that would be dwarfed, in the following year, by the tens of millions of dollars in economic losses tied to a tourism and convention boycott of the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Mother Buries Her Son<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

On April 14, 2001 \u2014 the day of Timothy Thomas’s funeral \u2014 more than 2,000 people marched through the streets of Cincinnati. It was, notably, peaceful. The Reverend Al Sharpton traveled to Cincinnati and stood at the site of Thomas’s death. For a community that had spent four nights in confrontation with police and National Guard-adjacent state forces, the funeral march became something else: a public, dignified act of mourning, and a signal that the anger of the preceding days had a deeper root than property destruction \u2014 it was grief, organized and made visible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Angela Leisure would spend the following years as a fixture of the reform effort that grew out of her son’s death, a role she did not ask for and would not have chosen, but one she carried with a kind of hard-won moral authority that no city official could match.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trial of Stephen Roach<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Patrolman Stephen Roach was charged with negligent homicide in the death of Timothy Thomas. His trial began in September 2001, only months after the unrest, in a city still raw from it. Roach testified that in the darkness of the alley, he believed Thomas was reaching for a gun. In September 2001, he was acquitted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Roach did not return to regular patrol duty in the department’s eyes the same man he had been before. He later resigned from the Cincinnati Police Department. For many in Cincinnati’s Black community, the acquittal \u2014 following, as it did, the earlier acquittal of the officers involved in Roger Owensby’s death \u2014 confirmed a pattern they had already lived through: that the criminal legal system, as structured, was not going to deliver individual accountability in these cases. That conviction did not end the push for change; if anything, it redirected it. Attention shifted from the criminal prosecution of a single officer toward systemic reform of the department itself \u2014 a shift that had, in truth, already been set in motion by the profiling lawsuit filed before Thomas ever died.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Cost the City Chose Not to See Coming<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The direct property damage from four nights of unrest \u2014 roughly $3.6 million \u2014 was, in the end, the smaller number. In the months that followed, a coordinated economic boycott of Cincinnati, organized in part by the hip-hop and entertainment industry and by national civil rights figures in solidarity with local organizers, steered conventions, concerts, and tourism dollars away from the city. Estimates of the resulting economic loss ran as high as $10 million, and some later analyses that included lost convention business and cancelled events put the combined cost of the unrest and its aftermath at more than $15 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That boycott was, in its way, as important to what happened next as the unrest itself. It converted moral pressure into economic pressure that Cincinnati’s business and political establishment could not simply wait out. The settlement negotiations that produced the Collaborative Agreement were already technically underway before Thomas died \u2014 the profiling lawsuit predated his death by weeks \u2014 but the unrest, and the boycott that followed it, changed the political arithmetic entirely. What might have taken years, or might never have happened at all, was compressed into twelve months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Rupture to the Collaborative Agreement<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

On April 11, 2002 \u2014 four days after the first anniversary of Timothy Thomas’s death \u2014 representatives of the City of Cincinnati, the Cincinnati Police Department, the Fraternal Order of Police, the Cincinnati Black United Front, and the ACLU of Ohio signed what became known as the Collaborative Agreement. It settled the racial-profiling lawsuit that had been filed weeks before Thomas’s death, and it was approved by U.S. District Judge Susan Dlott in August 2002, alongside a related Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice that resolved a separate federal civil-rights investigation into a pattern of excessive force within the department.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The agreement was, by design, unusual. Rather than simply imposing new rules on police from outside, it bound the city, the police union, and community plaintiffs together as co-owners of the reform process, under continuing federal court supervision. Its core commitments included:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022  A shift toward Community Problem-Oriented Policing (CPOP), organizing officers around solving underlying neighborhood problems rather than responding only to individual incidents;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022  New use-of-force and foot-pursuit policies, directly responsive to the circumstances of both the Owensby and Thomas deaths;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022  The creation of the Cincinnati Citizen Complaint Authority, a civilian oversight body empowered to investigate complaints against officers independently and to report its findings publicly;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2022  A formal, court-supervised monitoring and dispute-resolution structure, with an independent monitor empowered to evaluate the department’s progress against the agreement’s terms year over year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The agreement was not self-executing, and it was not always honored in good faith. In 2005, Judge Dlott ruled that the city had violated terms of the agreement by failing to give reform monitors adequate access, and warned that city or police officials could face fines or jail time for future violations. Mayor Luken, by then well into his tenure, criticized the ruling publicly \u2014 a reminder that a signed agreement did not, by itself, guarantee the political will to carry it out. The Collaborative Agreement’s first decade was less a straight line toward reform than a slow, contested, frequently re-litigated process \u2014 which is, in its way, the most honest thing that can be said about institutional change of this kind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legacy and Unfinished Work<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The clearest test of the Collaborative Agreement’s durability came fourteen years later, in July 2015, when a University of Cincinnati police officer shot and killed Samuel DuBose, an unarmed Black motorist, during a traffic stop just off campus. Unlike 2001, Cincinnati did not erupt. National Public Radio and other outlets reported at the time that the Collaborative Agreement \u2014 and the trust-building infrastructure it had forced into being over fourteen years \u2014 was widely credited with helping keep the city’s response to DuBose’s death peaceful, even as it exposed a real gap: the university’s police force had never been a party to the original agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the twentieth and twenty-fifth anniversaries of the unrest, in 2021 and 2026, Cincinnati’s police chiefs, former Fraternal Order of Police leadership, former Black United Front president Rev. Damon Lynch III, Mayor Luken himself, and residents who lived through the unrest as students and young professionals returned to the story in public retrospectives. Their accounts converge on a few hard truths: that the department’s slowness to communicate publicly in the hours after Thomas’s death deepened the community’s distrust; that the underlying racial disparity in who Cincinnati police stopped, searched, and used force against was real and had been documented before Thomas ever died; and that the reforms born out of 2001 \u2014 community policing, civilian oversight, use-of-force policy \u2014 represented genuine, if incomplete and unevenly sustained, change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was racial, because all the men who were being killed by the police were African American. So clearly, there was a racial component to it.<\/em>  \u2014 Rev. Damon Lynch III, former president of the Cincinnati Black United Front<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Cincinnati unrest of 2001 is also remembered, a decade and a half later, as an early data point in a national reckoning that would crystallize more fully after Trayvon Martin’s death in 2012 and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement in 2013 \u2014 a movement historians and Cincinnati residents alike have described as partly foreshadowed by what happened in Over-the-Rhine that April.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion: What the City Owes the Alley<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

It would be easy to remember April 2001 only as a riot \u2014 as fires and broken glass and a curfew, a story about property and disorder. That is not, in the end, what it was about. It was about a mother standing in front of her city council asking a question no one would answer. It was about a community that had buried fifteen young men in six years and had run out of patience for being asked, once again, to wait quietly for an internal investigation. It was about a 19-year-old father who went out for cigarettes and did not come home, whose only real offense was a stack of unpaid tickets and a decision, born of fear or instinct or both, to run.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Cincinnati built afterward \u2014 imperfectly, unevenly, under continued federal court supervision for years \u2014 was still something rare: an actual structural response, negotiated by the people most affected, rather than a commission report that gathered dust. That is worth remembering honestly, both the parts that worked and the parts that had to be forced through a judge’s order years later. The Collaborative Agreement did not erase the history that produced it, and it did not, on its own, resolve the deeper inequities \u2014 economic, educational, generational \u2014 that shaped Over-the-Rhine long before Timothy Thomas ever walked down that alley. But it proved that a city could be made to change its relationship with its own police department, if the people harmed by that relationship refused to let the demand go quiet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twenty-five years on, Cincinnati’s story is still being written by the organizers, precinct leaders, and civic institutions carrying that work forward \u2014 including the work of documenting it accurately, so it is not forgotten or flattened into a single night of fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

BlackPast.org. “Timothy DeWayne Thomas, Jr. (1981\u20132001).” blackpast.org\/african-american-history\/thomas-timothy-dewayne-jr-1981-2001\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

BlackPast.org. “The Cincinnati Riot (2001).” blackpast.org\/african-american-history\/the-cincinnati-riot-2001\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wikipedia. “Cincinnati riots of 2001.” en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Cincinnati_riots_of_2001<\/p>\n\n\n\n

EBSCO Research Starters. “Cincinnati riots of 2001.” ebsco.com\/research-starters\/history\/cincinnati-riots-2001<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati & Hamilton County Public Library. “20 Years Later: The Death of Timothy Thomas and the Uprising That Followed.” chpl.org\/blogs\/post\/20-years-later-timothy-thomas\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NBC News \/ Dateline NBC. “Behind the death of Timothy Thomas.” nbcnews.com\/id\/wbna4703574<\/p>\n\n\n\n

WCPO 9 Cincinnati. “Tense City Council meeting a pivotal moment in 2001 Cincinnati unrest.” wcpo.com\/news\/local-news\/tense-city-council-meeting-a-pivotal-moment-in-2001-cincinnati-unrest<\/p>\n\n\n\n

WCPO 9 Cincinnati. “Cincinnati police chiefs then and now reflect on lack of transparency in 2001 Timothy Thomas case.” wcpo.com\/news\/local-news\/cincinnati-police-chiefs-then-and-now-reflect-on-lack-of-transparency-in-2001-timothy-thomas-case<\/p>\n\n\n\n

WCPO 9 Cincinnati. “Timothy Thomas, civil unrest and a quest for equality: Where are we now?” wcpo.com\/news\/local-news\/timothy-thomas-civil-unrest-and-a-quest-for-equality-where-are-we-now<\/p>\n\n\n\n

WCPO 9 Cincinnati. “25 years later, Cincinnati looks back at racial tension and progress made since riots.” wcpo.com\/news\/local-news\/hamilton-county\/cincinnati\/25-years-later-cincinnati-looks-back-at-racial-tension-and-progress-made-since-riots<\/p>\n\n\n\n

WCPO 9 Cincinnati. “How policing in Cincinnati has changed since fatal shooting of Timothy Thomas 25 years ago.” wcpo.com\/news\/local-news\/hamilton-county\/cincinnati\/how-policing-in-cincinnati-has-changed-since-fatal-shooting-of-timothy-thomas-25-years-ago<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Local12\/WKRC. “Cincinnati marks 25 years since civil unrest, curfew after fatal police shooting.” local12.com<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Journal-News (Cox Media). “20 years since Cincinnati unrest: Residents recall Timothy Thomas’ killing and the hard days that followed.” journal-news.com<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati Magazine. “10 Events That Shaped Cincinnati: Timothy Thomas Is Shot and Killed.” By Cedric Rose. cincinnatimagazine.com\/citywiseblog\/10-events-that-shaped-cincinnati-timothy-thomas-is-shot-and-killed\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

University of Wisconsin, Race, Politics, and Justice project. “Cincinnati 2001: Police Killing of Timothy Thomas and Insurrection.” ssc.wisc.edu\/soc\/racepoliticsjustice\/2024\/01\/19\/cincinnati-2001-police-killing-of-timothy-thomas-and-insurrection<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Daily Pennsylvanian. “A senseless killing inspires action.” thedp.com\/article\/2001\/04\/a_senseless_killing_inspires_action<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati Enquirer, via UC Irvine collaborative-agreement archive. Rothman, Jay. “Improving Police-Community Relations in Cincinnati: A Collaborative Approach,” Fall 2003. sites.socsci.uci.edu\/~pgarb\/istudies\/applied\/presentations\/site\/media\/printarticles\/wy7-p.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati Enquirer, via UC Irvine archive. Anglen, Robert. “Profiling settlement approved,” August 6, 2002. sites.socsci.uci.edu\/~pgarb\/istudies\/applied\/presentations\/site\/media\/printarticles\/h9-p.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati Enquirer, via UC Irvine archive. Goetz, Kristina, and Gregory Korte. “Deals Provide Turning Point,” April 4, 2002. sites.socsci.uci.edu\/~pgarb\/istudies\/applied\/presentations\/site\/media\/printarticles\/h8-p.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cincinnati Enquirer, via UC Irvine archive. Horn, Dan. “Cincinnati may set a precedent \/ Proposal to end police probe unique,” April 4, 2002. sites.socsci.uci.edu\/~pgarb\/istudies\/applied\/presentations\/site\/media\/printarticles\/wt6-p.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NBC News. “Judge says Cincinnati violated riots deal.” nbcnews.com\/news\/amp\/wbna7327506<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In re Cincinnati Policing, Case No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio). “Collaborative Agreement.” Full text via City of Seattle Community Police Commission archive: seattle.gov\/documents\/departments\/communitypolicecommission\/cincinnati_collaborative_agreement.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. “Joint Amendment to the Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Department,” April 12, 2002 (amended 2006). justice.gov\/crt\/about\/spl\/documents\/cincinnati_pd_amend_agree_7-25-06.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NPR. “Police-Community Collaboration Has Helped Keep Peace in Cincinnati.” npr.org\/transcripts\/428355252<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

THE FIRE AND THE RECKONING Cincinnati’s April 2001 Unrest and the Long Road to the Collaborative Agreement A Research Essay Prepared for the Collaborative 25th Anniversary August 2026 In memory of Timothy DeWayne Thomas, Jr. (1981\u20132001), and of the fifteen Black men whose deaths at the hands of Cincinnati police preceded his. Contents Introduction: A Read More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-140","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/140","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=140"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/140\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":232,"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/140\/revisions\/232"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/collaborative25.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=140"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}